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1 
THE COEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
WITH EVERYTHING ELSE 
J.B. RUHL* 
 I am, first and foremost, an environmental lawyer. I have prac-
ticed, taught, and written in the environmental law field for going on 
twenty years. That has made me, by necessity, an administrative 
procedure specialist as well. One cannot practice environmental law 
at any sophisticated level without knowing the ins and outs of ad-
ministrative agencies and their powers and procedures. Neverthe-
less, I remain, at best, a mere dabbler in regulatory theory. And I 
don’t sense that I am different in that respect from most other vet-
eran environmental lawyers: we know administrative law, but we 
don’t often delve into pure regulatory theory. Furthermore, I don’t 
believe environmental lawyers are much different in that respect 
from the lawyers practicing in other substantive fields touched in 
some significant way by administrative law. 
 Why is that? Why do so many lawyers have this strong connection 
to administrative procedure, but a persistent detachment from regu-
latory theory? In pondering this I divided the world of lawyers into 
three types. The first type consists of a small cadre of administrative 
law junkies—gurus to the rest of us—who probe all the nooks and 
crannies of administrative law and ask the deep theoretical questions 
at every opportunity. These “Type I” lawyers are a font of regulatory 
theory. 
 At the other extreme are the “Type III” lawyers, those whose prac-
tice simply does not involve agencies, directly or indirectly. They 
never have need of administrative law and thus could care less about 
regulatory theory. With the growth of the administrative state, this 
is a small and shrinking group of lawyers, albeit perhaps a happy lot, 
given their infrequent forays into administrative law and bureauc-
racy.  
 In the middle fall the rest of us, the “Type II” lawyers. We are 
practitioners and academics working in substantive fields that are 
directly regulated or indirectly affected by the regulatory process. 
Many of these lawyers don’t know they are practicing administrative 
law, or don’t want to admit it, but they are. I’m going to retain my 
Type II persona and offer an explanation of why we have paid insuf-
ficient attention to regulatory theory—and why we should view a 
symposium such as this as “a good thing.” 
 My first observation as a Type II is an obvious point, that admin-
istrative law would perish on its own. It needs to attach itself to 
other fields of substantive law for it to live and breathe. Whether the 
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relationship it has with other fields is one of parasitism or mutual-
ism, the point is that they coevolve. Coevolution involves feedback 
loops between the coevolving systems, and these loops can be very 
loose, very tight, or somewhere in between.1 We see this all the time 
between administrative law and environmental law.  
 A good example is the bubble rule: The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) came up with the bubble rule in air pollution law; ad-
ministrative law picked it up as an administrative law issue. Soon 
the Chevron rule of deference to administrative interpretations of 
legislation was born, and since then environmental law has had to 
live with it. 2 Thus, moves that take place in one sphere prompt 
moves in the other, and so on back and forth. 
 The environmental lawyers in this tennis game are aware of the 
serves and volleys administrative law delivers, but we don’t get to 
see its game book. For one thing, we’re busy—busy working on the 
substance and theory of environmental law. We don’t have time to 
keep track of the Type I lawyers. And quite frankly, we’re too nar-
row-minded—mired in substance—to think very broadly about 
administrative law theory. The Type I lawyers, the administrative 
law junkies, roam the range of substantive fields and are thus in a 
better position to connect regulatory theory with regulatory 
experience.  But it is a mistake—a mistake I admit committing—for the Type 
II lawyers not to try to learn more about administrative law’s game. 
When I was in private practice we’d get so excited when a constitu-
tional law issue came along. We’d think theoretically! Administrative 
law issues were too garden-variety to evoke those emotions, and 
regulatory theory—well, that was even farther from our minds. 
That’s the irony: administrative law did more than constitutional law 
did to shape our day-to-day practice experience, but we simply took it 
for granted. Yet given the importance of regulatory theory to admin-
istrative law, and of administrative law to environmental law, there’s 
no doubt in my mind today that environmental lawyers could be bet-
ter environmental lawyers by paying more attention to regulatory 
theory. 
                                                                                                                  
 1. For more on the description of feedback loops and coevolution in law, see J.B. 
Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and 
Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996). 
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 Indeed, to get to the point of this, my introduction of the excellent 
principal papers in this symposium, each focuses on some feature of 
the coevolution process and offers us Type II lawyers insight into the 
regulatory theory in play. First, Professor Steven Croley’s paper on 
the role of special interests and public interests in regulation goes to 
the core of the interaction between administrative process and envi-
ronmental law substance.3 From its birth environmental law has 
never suffered from a shortage of special interests debating different 
visions of the public interest. 4 We’re still far from sorting it out. 
 Using (not surprisingly) for one of his case studies an example 
from environmental law, Professor Croley explores how outcomes are 
shaped by the feedback between the administrative process and the 
environmental law interests at stake. He makes a compelling case 
that administrative process has played a larger role in shaping out-
comes than “interest group” theories of regulation suggest. This tells 
us much about the coevolutionary dynamics at play. 
 Next, Professor Jody Freeman’s paper on the contracting state of-
fers a fascinating account of how environmental law is beginning to 
outgrow the box administrative law has built around it.5 As the co-
evolution between administrative law and environmental law pro-
gresses, we might say that the wiring between the two becomes 
tighter and tighter. Environmental law has been a pipeline of cases 
for administrative law to chew on;6 by the same token, however, en-
vironmental law has to live with what administrative law spits back. 
Over time, that has amounted to process rules that channel how en-
vironmental law can shape itself. But now we find environmental law 
experimenting with new forms of operating—such as, to use Profes-
sor Freeman’s examples, the Department of the Interior’s habitat 
conservation plans and EPA’s Project XL—that seem more like con-
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tracts than conventional regulation. Professor Freeman questions 
whether administrative law as presently structured and theoretically 
grounded is ready for this new spin environmental law has put on 
the ball. Clearly this is a move by environmental law, and other 
fields as well, that will require some deliberate and careful coevolu-
tionary response from administrative law. 
 In the third paper, Professor Matthew Adler also covers topics im-
portant to this continuing coevolution.7 Environmental law theory is 
brimming with welfare economics: Pigouvian taxes, Hardin’s Tragedy 
of the Commons, the Coase theorem, and externalities are the bread 
and butter of environmental law theory.8 More recently, however, 
environmental law has begun to reconsider what “welfare” means, 
how it is measured, and whether the conventional views really work 
in the long run.9 Similarly, Professor Adler suggests a new theory of 
regulation based on an updated vision of social welfare. He questions 
whether neoclassical and proceduralist theories of regulation remain 
vital, just as environmental law is reexamining its regulatory foun-
dations. Perhaps this is evidence that administrative law and envi-
ronmental law are so closely wired that their underlying theories are 
also coevolving. 
 Finally, Professors Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer provide a 
fascinating critique of the emerging positive political theory of ad-
ministrative law and its emphasis on using Supreme Court cases as 
the font of regulatory theory.10 From the first year of law school we 
are programmed to think that the Supreme Court is where it all 
happens. But any seasoned environmental lawyer knows the signifi-
cance of the D.C. Circuit to our field.11 The D.C. Circuit—as well as, 
to a lesser extent, the other U.S. Courts of Appeals—often is the end 
of the line. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the Supreme 
Court is irrelevant to our field.12 
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2000]  COEVOLUTION  5 
 
 As Professors Cohen and Spitzer suggest, perhaps it’s really the 
Solicitor General who has made this so in both respects, not only for 
environmental law but for regulatory fields in general, by acting as a 
filter on the regulatory cases we get to “see” in the Supreme Court. 
Their findings in this regard extend to explaining the clear bias on 
the Court for the government when government does seek review. 
They counsel that we take this “strategic petitioning” effect into ac-
count when using Supreme Court jurisprudence as a bellwether of 
regulatory theory. 
 All in all, then, the papers speak to me in terms of the coevolution 
of my world with theirs, of Type II lawyers with Type I lawyers. They 
have taught me to pay more attention to regulatory theory when I 
think about environmental law, and to tell my fellow Type II lawyers 
to do so as well. With that, I gladly turn the proceedings back over to 
the Type I lawyers and only hope I can keep up. 
 
